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I. INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the 21st century, a new plague is leeching
across the nation's legal landscape. "Some call it the Perfect Storm-a
confluence of events that merged into a financial crisis for the
insurance industry and a politically charged catastrophe for...
homeowners, threatening disaster for the.., economy."1 What exactly
is this Perfect Storm quickly overwhelming both the legislative and
judicial systems? Mold. Not the harmless mold growing in a
neglected bathtub, but toxic mold that can ravage homes and other
buildings from the inside out, while allegedly causing the inhabitants
to suffer nasty fates. Mold destroying dwellings is nothing new; even
the original Israelites suffered its wrath in the arid confines of the
Promised Land. "[I]f the mildew has spread in the house, it is a
destructive mildew; the house is unclean. It must be torn down-its
stones, timbers and all the plaster-and taken out of the town to an
unclean place." 2 As this passage illustrates, human aversion to mold
is nothing new.
What is new is the growing recognition of mold infestation as a
cause of action for both personal and property damage claims. Indeed,
mold litigation is growing at such an alarming rate that legal
commentators across the country are asking the one question sure to
send insurance adjusters scrambling: Will mold cases be the next
version of asbestos? 3 It is still much too early to tell with any
certainty.4 The first instance of an appellate court allowing testimony
1. R.G. Ratcliffe, Crisis Spawns Political Storm Clouds; As Insurance Woes Rattle
Homeowners, Texas Candidates Argue over Solutions to the Chaos, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 29,
2002, at Al.
2. Leviticus 14:44-45 (New Int'l).
3. See, e.g., Stephen L. Moll & Robert M. Reed, Jr., A Plague on Many Houses:
Proliferation of Mold, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 2002, at B10. The comparison of mold to asbestos is
generally appropriate given the quasi-environmental nature of both asbestos and mold, the
extremely large volume of litigation in asbestos and the rapid increase of mold litigation, the
large dollar amounts paid during the last thirty years in the asbestos and mold cases, and the
overlapping of property and personal injury damage claims in both sorts of cases. See infra
Section V.A.
4. Although not the primary focus, this Note proposes that courts should reject the blanket
proclamation that mold is the "next asbestos." See infra Section V.A. There is a rapidly growing
body of work to support this proposition. See generally Thelma Jarman-Felstiner, Comment,
Mold Is Gold: But, Will It Be the Next Asbestos?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 529 (2003) (asserting that toxic
mold claims will never duplicate the volume of asbestos claims). Despite the speculative nature
of the comparison between toxic mold cases and large-scale asbestos litigation, as long as actors
in the toxic mold litigation arena continue to make the analogy and use their experiences with
asbestos as a reference point for resolving toxic mold claims, the comparison will remain
politically and legally charged.
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as to the scientific legitimacy of health-related toxic mold claims was
in 1997.5 Just four years later, a Texas jury awarded the Allison
family $32 million after finding that their insurance carrier acted in
both bad faith and a deceptive manner when evaluating various mold
claims for personal injury and property damage. 6  On national
television, the family claimed that toxic mold in their home caused
their young son to develop asthma and scarred lungs.7 They invited
the cameras of CBS's 48 Hours into their home to film the alleged
danger, claiming mold had contaminated all of the family's
possessions, which they later abandoned along with the home.8 Now
high-profile mold claims are spreading rapidly to other parts of the
country. 9 Indeed, many defense attorneys claim that the proliferation
of mold litigation is primarily a result of overblown media coverage. 10
Nevertheless, the dramatic appearance of mold litigation has
the potential to severely disrupt vast sectors of the economy. In the
near future, homeowners insurance may no longer be available to
many Americans as more insurers conclude they cannot afford the
5. Centex-Rooney Constr. Co. v. Martin County, 706 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
6. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 237 (Tex. App. 2002). However, on appeal the
award was reduced by $17 million because the court found that the insurer did not knowingly
breach its duty and thus there could be no support for the jury's $17 million award in punitive
and mental anguish damages. Id. at 256-58. The insurance company still faces a judgment of
over $4 million in actual mold damages plus interest and a nearly $9 million award for attorney's
fees. Id. at 263-65.
7. 48 Hours: Invisible Killers: Germs (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 2, 2000). At many
points in this program, and throughout many other news and legal periodicals, the Allison case
is referred to as the Ballard case, because the wife Melinda Ballard has generally been the public
face of the family, while her husband Ronald Allison has remained in the background. This Note
refers to the family on the basis of the named plaintiff, Ronald Allison.
8. Id. The CBS crew toured the Allison's home only after donning protective body suits
and masks. Id.
9. See, e.g., Marianne Bradshaw, Toxic Mold Litigation Is in the Air, N.J. L.J., July 8,
2002, at 10; Lori Litchman, Mold Claims Springing Up in Pennsylvania, PA. L. WLY., Sept. 2,
2002, at 1. One notable case involved Hollywood legend Ed McMahon, who sued his insurance
company for $20 million after a so-called "death mold" damaged his home, sickened household
staff, and killed his dog Muffin. See, e.g., Ann O'Neill, Ed McMahon Sues over Mold in House,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at C-i, 2002 WL 2467283; Ed McMahon: 'Death Mold'Killed My Dog,
ABCNEWS.cOM, Apr. 11, 2002, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/entertainmentDailyNews/
mcmahon02O4ll.html. McMahon's lawsuit named a total of twelve defendants for the mold
damage caused by a broken water line and the subsequent faulty repair. C.A. Rules Court May
Not Shorten Summary Judgment Notice Period, METRO. NEWS ENTER., Feb. 10, 2003, at 3,
http://www.metnews.com/articles/mcma021OO3.htm. Famed legal advocate Erin Brockovich also
took on a high-profile role warning of the perils of toxic mold after she claimed her home was
rendered uninhabitable due to toxic mold infestation. See, e.g., Rochelle Sharpe, Mold Getting a
Costly Hold on Homes, USA TODAY, June 20, 2002, at 15A.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Amon, As Toxic Mold Suits Grow, Insurers Go, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21,
2002, at A-i; Margie Boule, Toxic Mold or Media Hype? Lack of Proof Leaves Worried Families in
Limbo, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 9, 2000, at E01 (quoting a medical toxicologist who is
cautious of published reports that link to toxic mold to serious health problems).
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risks associated with mold claims. Insurance is a statistical exercise
of calculating risks, and no insurer can cover a loss that is likely to
occur in a large percentage of its open policies.'1 Even the best-run
companies will fail when an expensive loss such as losses that mold
can create affects too large a number of its insureds. 12 Although the
insurance industry does not typically engender much sympathy, if
mold litigation is allowed to bankrupt major sureties, the entire
economy will suffer.
The transaction costs associated with the mold phenomenon
will also spill out into numerous other sectors of the economy,
primarily because toxic mold is such a new legal frontier that is
fraught with uncertainty. 13 Lenders cannot quantify the risk of loss
on a property due to toxic mold nor adequately quantify the resulting
liabilities if toxic mold appears in a property in which the lender has a
security interest.1 4 Property managers similarly cannot adequately
estimate the price that should compensate for the risk of mold into
everything from large-scale commercial and government leases to
condominium rentals.15  Professionals such as architects and
contractors will suffer as they increasingly become exposed to larger,
yet still uncertain, liabilities stemming from toxic mold claims. They
will not be able to adequately shoulder the risk or obtain cost-efficient
insurance coverage. 16
This is not to say that victims of both health-related injuries
and property damage due to mold should not have legal recourse.
Courts, however, have an obligation to set parameters at the outset of
this new mass litigation phenomenon. They must look to both
successes and failures that thirty years of unchecked asbestos
litigation has created when charting a course to navigate the coming
wave of mold claims. Asbestos litigation may have produced societal
benefits and needed industrial reform, but it also spiraled out of
control and produced disproportionate economic losses. 17  Since
asbestos and other large scale toxic crises have been in the legal
spotlight for so long, there is a tendency to force new, yet wholly
unrelated, phenomena such as toxic mold into the same category as
11. See ROBERT I. MEHR & EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 34-35 (1980).
12. Id.
13. See Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Stephanie M. Irby, The Transactional Challenges Posed by
Mold: Risk Management and Allocation Issues, 56 ARK. L. REV. 295, 303-07 (2003).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 351-53.
16. Id. at 357-58.
17. Jarman-Felstiner, supra note 4, at 540-43.
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asbestos.18 The judicial system can avoid this mistake by establishing
concrete guidelines sooner rather than later.
Most mold litigation to date ultimately centers on an insurer's
duty to defend, indemnify, or provide coverage. Courts often make an
early decision that is potentially outcome determinative in these cases
when they decide which insurance trigger of coverage theory will
apply in the case. The trigger of coverage is a legal test applied by
courts to determine which policy has coverage obligations under a
claim brought by the policy holder.19 The trigger of coverage also
determines whether numerous policies stretching over several years
will also have to respond to the loss. 20 In the broadest sense, courts
group the available trigger theories into the following four categories:
the exposure theory; the manifestation or first discovery theory; the
triple trigger or continuous trigger theory; and the injury-in-fact
theory.21 A court's application of a given trigger theory depends on the
jurisdiction, the type of harm or damage, and the specific facts of the
case at hand.
22
Trigger theories act as judicial gatekeepers, matching
particular claims to particular insurance policies.23  Judicially
constructed rules identifying which insurance policies may have to
respond to particular claims will have a strong influence on the
eventual resolution of those claims.24  These rules have been
particularly relevant in mass tort cases where the courts have actively
promoted settlement instead of litigation. 25 Insurance becomes a sort
of "judicial carrot" which a court can use to promote settlements. To
the extent that insurance is available and the court indicates which
policy will respond under its trigger rule, the court forces insurers to
bear the burdens of settlement rather than claimants. 26 Uniform
application of insurance triggers allows insurers to calculate with
relative precision the risk of a given occurrence such as mold. It will
not eliminate the transaction costs relevant to a broad spectrum of
18. Id. at 531-32.
19. See MITCHELL L. LATHROP, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS § 1.6
(2002).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 6.04. Another approach, the wrongful act theory, has been advanced but not
widely accepted, and bears no mention in the context of toxic mold claims. Id. For more detailed
analysis of each of these insurance triggers, see infra Part IV.B.
22. See LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04.
23. See James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure Tort Claims: The Debate
over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 625, 631-32 (1997).





economic actors in the mold arena, such as accounting for mold risks
when lending against property and insuring developers and
contractors against potential mold claims. It could, however,
eliminate much of the uncertainty from these costs and ensure that
they do not serve as insurmountable impediments to insurance and
other transactions.
This Note proposes that one way of fairly and efficiently
managing large numbers of toxic mold claims, while at the same time
putting reasonable safeguards in place to ensure that toxic mold never
fulfills the "next asbestos" predictions, is to uniformly apply the
manifestation trigger of coverage theory when construing insurance
contracts. Under the manifestation rule, a claim that is discoverable
or becomes apparent during a policy period will trigger that policy. 27
Because injury or damage can only be discovered once, only the
insurance policy in force at that time will provide coverage. By
uniformly applying only the manifestation trigger to insurance
policies, as opposed to the exposure theories generally favored in
asbestos litigation, courts would limit situations in which multiple
insurance policies have to respond to the same injury. 28
More importantly, courts would eliminate the uncertainty
plaguing the toxic mold arena and allow insurers to adequately assess
their potential liabilities; in other words, the insurance industry would
be able to effectively price the risk posed by toxic mold. Once the
insurance industry is able to do so, then other sectors of the economy,
such as lending, property management, construction, and even
ordinary homeowners, will be able to assess their economic exposure
to toxic mold and plan accordingly. Additionally, insurers and legal
professionals will have a basis on which to negotiate settlements on
pending mold claims, preventing tens of thousands of claims from
clogging up the judicial channels.
Part II of this Note provides both historical and scientific
background on the mold plague leeching its way across the country.
Part III discusses the relatively small but rapidly growing body of case
law on mold claims. Part IV of this Note traces the competing trigger
theories courts have traditionally applied in asbestos claims. Part V
of this Note proposes that uniformly applying the manifestation
trigger theory will ultimately provide a check on uncontrolled mold
litigation in the future, as well as an equitable balance between
injured plaintiffs and their insurance carriers.
27. See generally Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. Amer. Home Assurance Co., 613 F.
Supp. 1549, 1556 (D.N.J. 1985) (explaining the manifestation theory in the context of asbestos
litigation).
28. See infra Part V.B.
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II. BACKGROUND ON TOXIC MOLDS
A. Scientific Overview of Toxic and Other Molds
Molds are very simple microscopic organisms found virtually
everywhere, both indoors and outdoors. 29 There are over 100,000
known species of mold, with at least 1,000 found commonly
throughout the United States.30 Most molds are not dangerous to
humans at all; the majority of molds routinely encountered by humans
will, in cases of overexposure, do nothing more than aggravate
conditions such as hay fever, asthma, or other allergies. 31 In fact, a
number of molds are used in everyday products ranging from bread
and wine to penicillin. 32
Molds require three essential elements for growth: (1) warm
air, (2) a viable food source, and (3) moisture. 33 Warm air is present in
most homes and buildings. Various mold species can survive in any
environment where the temperature falls within a range of forty to
one-hundred degrees Fahrenheit. 34 Certainly the need for sustainable
temperatures helps to explain why mold claims have been far more
numerous, at least initially, in warmer states such as Arizona,
California, Louisiana, and Texas. Any number of organic materials,
such as cotton, leather, drywall, insulation, and synthetic carpets and
sidings, all usually found in homes and buildings, can provide a viable
food source for molds to thrive. 35 Even dirt and wood can provide
enough of a food source to sustain chronic mold growth.3 6 The most
critical ingredient is moisture, and moisture is "the only factor that
29. See, e.g., Office of Envtl. & Occupational Epidemiology, N.Y. City Dep't of Health, Facts




32. See, e.g., Stephen A. Henning & Daniel J. Berman, Mold Contamination: Liability and
Coverage Issues: Essential Information You Need to Know for Successfully Handling and
Resolving Any Claim Involving Toxic Mold, 8 HASTINGS W.-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73, 82
(2001).
33. LATHROP, supra note 19, § 12.02.
34. See Mold: A Growing Problem: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations and the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the House Comm.
on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 51 (2002) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (statement of Gerald M.
Howard, Executive Vice President/CEO, Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders).
35. Marilyn Bode & Deanna Munson, Controlling Mold Growth in the Home, NEAR ENV'T,
Kan. St. Univ. Agric. Experiment Station & Coop. Extension Serv., Sept. 1995, at 1-2,
http://www.oznet.ksu.edu/library/hous2/mf2141.pdf.
36. See Henning & Berman, supra note 32, at 80-81.
2004] 247
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can be controlled" 37 since little if anything can ever be done to
eliminate warm temperatures or organic food sources. Moisture
usually appears primarily as a result of water intrusion due to
flooding, a plumbing leak, or condensation within the walls of the
structure.38  Miniscule amounts of trapped rainwater or even
condensation from air conditioning units is enough to feed a mold
outbreak. 39 The matter is further complicated because mold does not
require actual standing water to grow, but can appear simply as a
result of high humidity combined with building materials that tend to
retain moisture.40 The determination of when and why this mold-
growing moisture appears is at the heart of most insurance disputes
arising from mold claims.
"Toxic" mold is not a scientific term per se, but rather refers to
the very limited group of molds that can cause potentially serious
health problems. 41 Toxic molds produce mycotoxins, fungal metabolites
that cause a variety of respiratory and other health problems. 42 Any
toxic effects resulting from mold exposure stem from exposure to these
toxins found "on the surface of the mold spores," and not from any
form of mold actually infiltrating the body. 43 There are three varieties
of toxic molds: stachybotrys chartarum, aspergillus, and penicillium.
The first is the dominant variety in mold claims and will be the focus
of this discussion.
44
Stachybotrys chartarum is generally regarded as the most
prevalent of the toxic molds.45 It is a greenish black fungus that grows
in very wet environments. 46 Its spores are found in soil and enter
buildings after floods or other sudden water intrusions.47 The spores
also latch onto building materials coated with dust.48 Stachybotrys
chartarum grows on papers, carpet, and any organic debris or
material in general. 49 Because this mold occurs inside ducts, walls, or
37. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 51.
38. See Henning & Berman, supra note 32, at 80-81.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 80.
41. Id. at 81.
42. See LATHROP, supra note 19, § 12.02.
43. Ruth A. Etzel et al., Toxic Effects ofIndoor Molds, 101 PEDIATRICS 712, 712 (1998).
44. See Henning & Berman, supra note 32, at 81-82.





49. See Henning & Berman, supra note 32, at 81.
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covered surfaces, it may be present without being seen. 50 Stachybotrys
chartarum is believed by some to attack the respiratory system,
causing severe or fatal lung disease, and to contain chemicals that
may be neuro-toxic, causing behavioral difficulties. 51 It has also been
linked, albeit inconclusively, to pulmonary hemorrhage, particularly
in children.52 There still exists considerable controversy as to the
exact magnitude and scope of the health problems caused by
stachybotrys chartarum, but the mold has been researched extensively
for over sixty-five years now and there is little doubt that
contaminated environments are not healthy and may pose varying
health risks to humans, and children in particular. 53 Indeed, some of
the chemical components present in the mold have been studied as
potential agents of biological warfare.
54
B. Brief History of Human Contact With Toxic Molds
Toxic mold was first recognized as a serious health risk in
Eastern Europe during the 1930s. 55 Horses and other farm animals
were suffering a disease that caused severe shock, hemorrhage, and
death.56 Russian scientists traced the outbreaks to moldy straw or
other feed that the animals consumed.57 Soon, farm workers began
exhibiting the symptoms as well.58 This strain of toxic mold is now
known to be stachybotrys chartarum and is the primary, although not
exclusive, culprit in most reported cases of mold-related heath
problems. 5
9
Little attention was paid to toxic molds in the United States
until 1986 when a Chicago family began complaining of recurring flu-
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Facts About Mold, supra note 29.
52. See Nelson, supra note 45. Stachybotrys chartarum was initially blamed for a cluster of
lung hemorrhages in Cleveland children during the mid-1990s. Id. Although the study of
Cleveland children was commissioned by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
in 2000, the CDC published two new reports that criticized the Cleveland study for, among other
things, faulty sampling techniques. Id.
53. Id.
54. LATHROP, supra note 19, § 12.03.
55. Id. § 12.01.
56. Id. § 12.03.
57. Id. § 12.01.
58. See Nelson, supra note 45. The exposed workers generally handled the mold-infested
hay or used it as filling for their mattresses. Id.
59. See LATHROP, supra note 19, §§ 12.03-.04.
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like symptoms. 60 Experts later determined that the family's home was
infested with stachybotrys chartarum. When the mold problem was
remedied, the symptoms generally subsided.61 In 1994, the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) began a study of numerous infant illnesses
and deaths in Cleveland. 62 Although the study was not wholly
conclusive, investigators suspected that toxic mold was indeed
responsible for causing these deaths and illnesses, putting
stachybotrys chartarum firmly in the spotlight.63 It must be stressed,
however, that the majority of the medical community still believes
that no firm link between stachybotrys chartarum and human health
problems has been scientifically demonstrated. 64 The furthest that
any credible scientific body has been willing to go is concluding that
toxic molds may affect those with severe respiratory or immune
deficiencies. Even then they maintain that "[c]urrent scientific
evidence does not support the proposition that human health has been
adversely affected by inhaled mycotoxins .... "65
The appearance of toxic mold complaints follows a phenomenon
common in the last few decades known as sick building syndrome.
66
As buildings and homes became more energy efficient and
weatherproof while, at the same time, the use and presence of office
machines, central air and heating systems, and newer cleaning
products soared, indoor air stagnated and people began experiencing
various maladies attributed to the "sick building."67 No specific cause
or even illness has been firmly attributed to "sick building syndrome,"
but it has been blamed for various eye, nose, and throat irritations,
60. See Nelson, supra note 45. The fungus was continually studied between the 1950s and




63. Id. The CDC later criticized this report for questionable research methods; nonetheless
it has remained influential in the scientific and medical communities as they continue to
document the effects of toxic mold on humans. See suprq Part II.A.
64. See, e.g., TEXAS MED. ASS'N, REPORT OF COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS: BLACK MOLD
AND HUMAN ILLNESS (2002), http://www.tcais.org/insurance/mold-study.php. This report
concludes, among other things, that "[o]ur knowledge of mycotoxins is very incomplete regarding
dose-health effects," and "there is no convincing evidence that Stachybotrys is a significant or
even proven pathogenic antigen .... " Id. The report also notes at the outset that all of the
current public attention on toxic mold has been focused on the lay press and insurance industry,
and not at all on scientific or medical publications. Id.
65. AM. COLL. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED., ADVERSE HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS
ASSOCIATED WITH MOLDS IN THE INDOOR ENVIRONMENT (2002), http://www.acoem.org/
guidelines/article.asp?ID=52.
66. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Sheryl-Lynn Carof, The Legal Control of Indoor Air Pollution,
25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 339 (1998).
67. Id. at 338-40.
[Vol. 57:1250
TOXIC MOLD LITIGATION
along with headaches and fatigue that subside upon leaving the
building.68 The sudden appearance and subsequent rapid increase in
toxic mold claims may be partially accounted for because in searching
for the potential sources of this "sick building syndrome," previously
ignored molds inside of homes and buildings were suddenly put under
the microscope.
III. SUMMARY OF TOXIC MOLD LITIGATION
A. Toxic Mold as a Viable Cause of Action
Toxic mold cases thus far have generally fit within three
categories: (1) suits by home or building owners against builders for
faulty design or construction; (2) suits by tenants alleging landlord
negligence for failure to maintain sanitary living conditions; and (3)
suits by home or building owners against insurers for breach of
contract or bad faith.69 Often, however, cases that begin in one of the
first two categories end up in the third category as defendants seek
coverage or indemnification from their insurance companies for the
original mold claims brought against them. Toxic mold cases are just
beginning to reach the appellate courts, and very few have yet
resulted in published opinions.
One of the first noteworthy cases heard by a state appellate
court was Centex-Rooney Construction Co. v. Martin County, decided
by a Florida court in 1997.70 Centex-Rooney was particularly
significant because it was the first instance in which a court allowed
scientific testimony on health risks associated with toxic mold. 71
Centex-Rooney constructed a courthouse complex for Martin County,
Florida, which subsequently developed leaks in the exterior walls and
windows as well as moisture accumulation throughout the buildings'
heating and cooling systems. 72 As a result of the moisture problems,
mold began to grow throughout the building complex. 73 Experts
68. Id. at 340-41.
69. See D. Chris Harkins, Comment, The Writing Is on the Wall... And Inside It: The
Recent Explosion of Toxic Mold Litigation and the Insurance Industry Response, 33 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1101, 1104 (2002).
70. 706 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
71. See id. at 26. It is important to note that mere expert testimony, as was allowed in this
and other cases, does not necessarily reflect the consensus of the relevant scientific community.
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
72. Centex-Rooney, 706 So. 2d at 23-25.
73. Id. at 24-25.
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retained by Martin County concluded that a number of the buildings'
employees were suffering from work-related asthma likely linked to
the presence of two types of unusual and toxic molds.74
On appeal, Centex-Rooney argued that the expert testimony
regarding toxic mold should never have been admitted under the long-
standing Frye v. United States evidentiary standard, the applicable
standard in Florida courts at the time.75  The appellate court,
however, felt the scientific evidence regarding toxic mold could be
admitted, holding that the County had met its burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the basic underlying principles
had been sufficiently tested and accepted by the relevant scientific
community. 76 Martin County ultimately recovered a judgment of more
than $14 million in damages, interest, and attorney fees against
Centex-Rooney, several subcontractors, and their insurers. 77
In 2001, the Delaware Supreme Court likewise upheld the
admittance of expert testimony and other evidence regarding the
deleterious health effects of toxic mold. 78 New Haverford Partnership
v. Stroot involved two plaintiffs who were tenants of an apartment
complex infested with toxic mold.79 Three physicians testified that one
of the plaintiffs was suffering from various respiratory ailments and
possible cognitive dysfunction either caused or exacerbated by her
exposure to toxic mold.80 The landlord was ultimately held liable for
negligently failing to maintain the leased premises in a sanitary
condition, which led to the plaintiffs' personal injuries from toxic mold
exposure.81 The Delaware Supreme Court upheld an award of $1
74. Id.
75. Id. at 26. The Frye standard states that "while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs." 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This evidentiary
standard has been supplanted in federal cases by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and "general
acceptance" is no longer the controlling standard, which in theory should aid the admission of
scientific evidence on mold even further. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589 (1993). However, many state courts, such as Florida, still adhere to the older Frye standard.
See, e.g., Centex-Rooney, 706 So. 2d at 26.
76. Centex-Rooney, 706 So. 2d at 26.
77. See LATHROP, supra note 19, § 12.04.
78. New Haverford P'ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 799-800 (Del. 2001).
79. Id. at 795-96.
80. Id. at 796-97. The primary plaintiff, Stroot, had suffered from severe allergies and
asthma since childhood. Id. at 796. But the frequency and intensity of these ailments were
gauged to have increased significantly after she moved into the apartment in question. Id.
81. Id. at 795.
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million for the primary plaintiff and $40,000 for the second claimant,
finding the awards neither unreasonable nor unconscionable.
8 2
These cases are significant because in each instance the court
admitted expert testimony regarding the potential health risks
associated with toxic mold, giving credibility to what many
commentators considered a rather dubious cause of action.
8 3
Substantial jury awards were also upheld in both cases, giving further
legitimacy to mold claims across the nation.
In 1999, a Texas jury awarded the Allison family a staggering
$32 million award which, although substantially reduced on appeal,
proved that large awards were quite possible in mold cases.8 4 After
CBS toured the Allison's home for its Killer Germs television special in
2000, stories and warnings about toxic mold began to spread across
the country.8 5 Interestingly, the jury provided this huge award even
though the trial court actually refused to admit expert testimony on
the effects of toxic mold.8 6 The appellate court upheld the trial judge's
ruling that the underlying data informing the testimony offered by the
Allison's experts did not meet the Texas evidentiary requirements for
toxic tort cases.8 7 The personal injury claim for toxic mold exposure
was thus defeated by partial summary judgment before the jury ever
set foot in the courtroom. The large award was based solely on the
property damage and the insurer's subsequent bad faith in handling
the claims.
88
Despite this exclusion, a close reading of the facts coupled with
the current trends in mold litigation strongly indicates that this ruling
on the admissibility of expert testimony on the health hazards of toxic
mold will not stem the tide of lawsuits. It appears that the experts in
82. Id. at 801.
83. See, e.g., Amon, supra note 10; Sue Reisinger, Toxic Mold Is Good as Gold for Plaintiffs'
Lawyers, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 2002, at 52, WL 9/02 CORPLT 52 (col. 1).
84. See supra Part I. Although in late 2002 a Texas court reduced the award by $17
million, it is significant to note that the defendant insurers had to pay nearly $9 million in
attorney fees to the plaintiffs, making the partial victory bittersweet. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
98 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App. 2002); Punitive Damages Award Reversed Absent Knowing Breach of
Contract, 3-1 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MOLD 1 (Jan. 2003).
85. See supra Part I.
86. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 240.
87. Id. at 240-41.
88. Id. The fact that no testimony was allowed regarding the health effects of the toxic
mold gives further credence to the claim that mold hysteria has largely been fueled by media
hype. Numerous media outlets portrayed the Allison home with ominous figures clad in full
protective body suits, including Mrs. Ballard herself dressed in a bio-hazard "moon suit." But, in
essence, the case was strictly an insurance breach of contract, with mold being only a sidebar.
See Randy J. Maniloff, Mold: The Hysteria Among Us-Exposure to Mold Causes Bad Faith
Claims Against Insurers, 14 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 1, 3 (2002).
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this case simply failed to adhere to strict procedural requirements
that are particularly important in emerging toxic torts.8 9 Courts
appear to be more willing to accept the general medical proposition
that black mold, at least in the form of stachybotrys chartarum, is
potentially hazardous to human health.90
In July 2002, at a Congressional Subcommittee hearing
entitled "Mold: A Growing Problem," CDC scientists testified that
while the direct links between toxic mold and specific health problems
are still unclear, toxic molds do contain carcinogens and, in high
levels, cause illness in "susceptible people."91 At the same time, a
Michigan Congressman introduced the United States Toxic Mold
Safety and Protection Act of 2002.92 The Bill would have required the
CDC, in conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency and
the National Institutes of Health, to undertake a comprehensive study
of the health effects of toxic mold.93 However, the bill has since
languished and has not been enacted to date.
In contrast to the federal government, states are taking more
affirmative steps to confront toxic mold. California enacted the Toxic
Mold Protection Act in October of 2001, creating a task force to set
statewide mold standards.94  Other state legislatures that have
addressed toxic mold and tried to sort out the conflicting scientific
data include Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Texas.95
These trends suggest that many lawmakers view toxic mold as a
legitimate threat to human health. Thus, the battle over expert
testimony may center more on linking toxic mold to the specific cause
of a given injury rather than on whether toxic mold is even capable of
harming humans.
96
89. Maniloff, supra note 88, at 3.
90. See, e.g., New Haverford P'ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 799-800 (Del. 2001).
91. See Maniloff, supra note 87, at 5-6.
92. United States Toxic Mold Safety and Protection Act of 2002 (Melina Bill), H.R. 5040,
107th Cong. (2002).
93. Id. § 102(a).
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 26100-26107 (West Supp. 2004).
95. See Wright & Irby, supra note 13, at 343-44; Sylvia Pefia-Alfaro, Comment, The Toxic
Mold Terrifying Texas: Mold's Hold on the Insurance Industry, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541, 571-74
(2003).
96. This note necessarily presumes that toxic mold will continue to be a viable cause of
action for both personal injury and property damage claims. There is likely to be a wealth of
scientific and medical research conducted in the near future on the health effects of toxic mold,
and it is possible that further doubt could be cast on the legitimacy of expert testimony regarding
the health hazards of mold. But the more likely scenario is that toxic mold will become firmly
entrenched as a legitimate toxic tort. Even if it does not, there will still be a flood of lawsuits
strictly on property damage claims, and this Note's analysis would still be applicable.
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B. Insurance Carriers Take Center Stage
The mold issue is already having a profound impact on the
insurance markets, with the Texas market leading the way. As a
response to the increasing cost of mold, State Farm Insurance
Company, the largest homeowner insurer in the country, recently
declined to renew more than 700,000 individual policies in Texas.
97 It
is estimated that up to 70 percent of the 10,000 mold cases pending
nationwide in 2002 were in Texas state courts. 98 Mold insurance
claims in Texas increased by more than 500 percent between 2001 and
2002.99 In 2001, Texas insurers paid out an estimated $1.2 billion to
resolve mold claims. 100  At the same time, the average annual
premiums paid by Texas homeowners increased by 35 percent to
nearly $1,000, the highest average premium in the nation.10 1
Insurance policies issued in the last few years typically address
coverage for mold claims in specific terms. 10 2 Older policies, which
have more vague treatment of mold coverage, present a much more
complicated issue. Unfortunately, most claims today are still being
filed against policies predating the current litigation explosion. On
older policies that did not specifically provide for mold, absolute
pollution exclusions, catchall provisions designed to insulate an
insurer from any variety of environmental ills not specifically
enumerated in the policy may provide the best grounds of defense for
insurers. 103 But this provision has failed when presented in similar
circumstances. An example of this failure comes from Leverence v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty, a case predating the current
trends and not even involving "toxic" mold per se. 10 4 Rather, the
plaintiffs in Leverence lived in manufactured homes that became so
water damaged that the walls were rotting and the air was
contaminated with mold spores, fungus, mildew, and various other
97. Amon, supra note 10.
98. See Reisinger, supra note 83, at 52.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Texas has been relatively quick in trying to ensure that insurance coverage for mold
damage remains available to ordinary consumers. After heated hearings, the state's Insurance
Commissioner promulgated rules capping mold coverage levels and requiring insurers to offer
policy addendums providing extra coverage for mold damages. See Pefia-Alfaro, supra note 95,
at 571-74. Several mold laws were also passed in 2003, including a bill regulating the cottage
mold-remediation industry, which also forbid insurers from basing underwriting decisions based
on prior mold claims. H.R. 329, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003), http://www.capitol.state.tx.
us/tlo/78R/billtext/HB00329F.HTM.
102. See Amon, supra note 10.
103. See Harkins, supra note 69, at 1127-28.
104. 462 N.W.2d 218, 232 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
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irritants. 10 5 The pollution exclusion clause, which the appellate court
held did not apply to damages caused by the airborne mold spores,
fungus, and mildew, reads as follows:
This insurance does not apply: to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden or
accidental. 106
The court ruled that the phrase "sudden and accidental" means
"unexpected and unintended." 10 7 Because the growth of the molds and
other airborne fungi was certainly unexpected and unintended, the
exclusion was inapplicable and the insurer was obligated to pay for
the damages.108 This ruling does not seem to give effect to the
insurance policy because any sort of damage for which insurance
coverage is sought will always be unexpected and unintended. The
purpose of the exception for sudden pollution events was to protect the
insured and encompass completely unforeseeable disasters. Water
damage severe enough to rot walls and cause such large scale mold
growth, however, certainly does not occur suddenly.
In the past several years, many insurance companies have
begun altering their comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies
issued to homeowners either to specifically exclude mold or to cap
payments for mold claims. 109 This change, however, does not impact
the majority of mold claims already in litigation channels based on
occurrences that predate these measures. In addition, carriers are
lobbying state insurance boards to allow them to eliminate mold
coverage in existing policies even where the mold is caused by a
covered event, such as a pipe bursting. 110 This is a tactic by insurers
to stretch the parameters for causation in future mold litigation to
their advantage, because mold can result from any number of both
natural and unnatural causes. Liristis v. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co."' illustrates the difficulties courts and insurers face in
categorizing toxic mold claims.
In Liristis, the insured plaintiffs' home caught fire and suffered





109. See Amon, supra note 10, at A-17.
110. Id.




led to water damage caused by the water used to suppress the fire
itself.113 Mold growth began to appear as a result, and the plaintiffs
claimed they suffered from respiratory ailments and allergic reactions
to toxic mold. 114 The homeowners insurance policy contained a clause
stating that the policy did not cover loss to property "resulting directly
or indirectly from or caused by one or more of the following," with an
enumerated list including mold.115 The plaintiffs, however, argued
that the mold damage was a covered "indirect physical loss" caused by,
among other things, the water used to extinguish the fire in their
home.1 16 They argued that the loss was not "caused by" mold, but
rather the loss was mold and that the mold was caused by the fire, a
covered event.1 17  The appellate court agreed.118  This ruling
exemplifies the confusion both courts and insurers face in defining
coverage for disasters not originally provided for and occurring in
unusual manners, such as mold.
Insurers will continue to argue that damage to persons or
property resulting from toxic mold is not covered under their policies.
Given past precedent, insurers will certainly have some success.
Beyond that argument, both plaintiffs and defendants are beginning
to focus on what could be a decisive battle line in toxic mold litigation:
which trigger of coverage will apply in this new arena." 9 The outcome
of this question could determine whether or not toxic mold litigation
will cost the insurance industry the unprecedented sums paid out in
asbestos litigation and impose the related trickle-down costs on a
plethora of other service providers and related professionals.'
20
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit heard a claim brought by the owners
of a shopping center in California seeking reimbursement from their
insurers of the $18 million spent to repair mold-ravaged property.
1 2'
Factory Mutual Insurance Co. v. Campbell is being closely watched by
the insurance industry, because the district court agreed with the
113. Id.
114. Id. at 23-24.
115. Id. at 24.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 25.
119. See infra Part IW.A.
120. See infra Part IV. Of course, it will be years and even decades before anyone can say
exactly how much asbestos claims will have totaled. Right now, industry estimates are that
between $200 and $265 billion will be paid out when all is said and done in the asbestos arena.
See Randy J. Maniloff, 2002: The Year's Ten Most Significant Insurance Coverage Decisions, 17-
10 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: INS. 12 (Jan. 2003).
121. 9th Circuit to Hear Arguments on Manifestation Theory in Mold Insurance Case, 3-4
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MOLD 8 (Apr. 2003).
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insurer that the claim should be barred by the manifestation rule; in
other words, the application of the manifestation trigger of coverage
meant the defendant insurer did not have to respond.122 The
defendant carrier successfully argued that the property owners were
aware of ongoing mold contamination prior to the commencement of
the insurance policy period and that there was no coverage for the
previously manifested damage. 123 The owners of the shopping center
countered on appeal that while the property had suffered water
damage on prior occasions and even some mold contamination prior to
the inception of the insurance policy in 1995, the discovery of toxic
mold in 1998 was an entirely separate and distinct type of damage. 124
The Ninth Circuit's decision will doubtless impact the entire mold
litigation landscape as it will be the highest federal court yet to
directly address a toxic mold case.
Another victory for insurance companies in a federal court was
New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Travelers Property Casualty Co., in
which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana threw out a claim for mold damage to a building leased to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 125 The court ruled that the
manifestation theory would apply to determine whether or not there
was coverage for mold contamination.1 26 The court held the plaintiffs
knew of the mold damage prior to the issuance of the disputed
insurance policy and that under the trigger of coverage rule adopted
by the court, the insurer could not insure against a loss that was
known or apparent to the insured. 27 But, while the primary insurer
prevailed in this case, other defendants, including the building
architects, settled out of court to avoid their own potential exposure to
toxic mold liability.128
Both Campbell and New Orleans Assets are particularly
noteworthy because, as expanded upon in detail in the following part,
122. Factory Mutual Ins. Co. v. Estate of Campbell, No. 01-7518R ITLx (C.D. Cal. March 18,
2002) (order granting summary judgment); California Federal Judge Bars Mold Property
Damage Claims in Coverage Dispute, 2-5 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MOLD 7 (May 2002). This case
will be a significant marker for the claim argued in this Note that the manifestation rule will
provide the best basis for managing the future influx of mold claims, particularly because the
manifestation rule was generally disfavored in asbestos litigation. See infra Part IV.
123. $18 Million Claim For Mold Barred By Manifestation Rule, Carrier Tells 9th Circuit
Court, 2-9 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MOLD 3 (Sept. 2002).
124. Id.
125. No. 01-2171, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25878, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 2002).
126. Id. at *8-9.
127. Id. at *10-11; see also Louisiana Federal Judge Dismisses Mold Claims in CGL Case, 2-
10 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MOLD 1 (Oct. 2002).
128. See Louisiana Federal Court to Address Dismissal Motion in Mold Coverage Case, 2-12
MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: MOLD 4 (Dec. 2002).
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courts have been reluctant to apply the manifestation rule in toxic tort
litigation. These cases could signal that the federal courts will at least
take a hard initial stance against finding coverage for toxic mold
claims by applying more insurer-favored trigger rules, which will be
discussed in further detail below.
IV. TRIGGER OF COVERAGE THEORIES IN ANALOGOUS LITIGATION
A. Why Coverage Triggers Will Matter in Mold
Although mold claims include unique characteristics, a review
of the most prominent toxic tort that the insurance industry has faced
on a large scale, asbestos, will provide a basis for both courts and
sureties to most effectively manage mold claims. Indeed, the
insurance industry has aggressively negotiated with many state
insurance commissioners by claiming that another round of
uncontrolled litigation akin to asbestos will bankrupt them. 129 Courts
involved in both asbestos and mold litigation will be forced to
determine when and how a particular insurance policy is triggered.130
Courts adjudicating asbestos claims have faced the fact that the
language of older insurance policies was generally difficult to apply to
asbestos-related injuries. 131 Because of the latent manifestation of the
disease, with serious health consequences from asbestos exposure
taking up to twenty-five years to appear, it took insurers a
considerable amount of time to begin adjusting their coverage terms to
account for it.132 Insurers have been litigating asbestos injury claims
since 1973, so newer insurance policies generally have explicit
provisions denying coverage for any injury related to asbestos. 33
Mold exclusion clauses, however, have only recently become a
standard component of most insurance policies, so numerous
129. See, e.g., Moll & Reed, supra note 3.
130. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
1982).
131. See John P. Burns et al., Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political
Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 709-10 (1983).
132. Id.
133. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092-93, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973)
(upholding a judgment for an employee of an asbestos manufacturer against his employer for
breach of duty to warn of the dangers of prolonged asbestos exposure). As the first significant
asbestos case, "Borel has triggered an avalanche of law suits against the entire asbestos
manufacturing industry." Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1215 (6th Cir. 1980).
2004] 259
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
insurance policies still have no provisions whatsoever for mold. 134
Courts will be called on to determine not only if a policy has to
respond to a mold claim, but which policy has to respond. 135
Insurance policies generally do not contain terms such as
"coverage" trigger.136 Triggers of coverage are legal tests applied by
courts to determine which policy has coverage obligations for a
particular claim. 137  Courts generally group the available trigger
theories into four categories: the exposure theory; the manifestation or
first discovery theory; the triple trigger or continuous trigger theory;
and the injury-in-fact theory.138 The application of a particular trigger
theory depends on the jurisdiction, the specific facts of the claim, and
the type of harm alleged in the claim.139
Trigger of coverage theories are described as "judicial
gatekeepers," matching specified claims to particular policies. 140 They
identify which insurance policies may have to respond to particular
claims and, consequently, have a strong influence on the ultimate
resolution of the cases. 141 These rules were particularly important in
mass tort cases where the courts actively promoted widespread
settlement.1 4
2
Insurance acts as a "judicial carrot" which a court can use to
promote settlements, because to the extent insurance is available and
the court establishes which trigger rules will force which policies to
respond, the burdens of settlement fall on insurers rather than on
claimants.1 43 Equally important, uniform application of insurance
triggers allows insurers to calculate their risk of losses in regard to a
given occurrence such as mold. While not eliminating the transaction
costs relevant to economic actors in the mold arena, uniform triggers
of coverage will help eliminate uncertainty caused by these costs and
134. See supra notes 102-103.
135. See supra notes 102-103.
136. Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 979 (N.J. 1994) (explaining that as
policies do not actually contain triggers, the term "is merely a label for the event or events that
under the terms of the insurance policy determines whether a policy must respond to a claim in a
given set of circumstances").
137. LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.01.
138. Id. § 6.04. Another approach, the wrongful act theory, has never been widely accepted,
and bears no mention here. Id. See infra Part IV.B for a detailed discussion on each of the
individual triggers of coverage.
139. LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04.
140. Fischer, supra note 23, at 631-32.





prevent them from being insurmountable obstacles to insurance and
many other transactions.
The following hypothetical, taken from a Comment by Nicolas
R. Andrea on the dilemmas posed by insurance trigger questions,
illustrates the drastically different results in a environmental
pollution case depending on which coverage trigger the court
applies. 144 While not directly analogous to how a mold claim might
transpire, it is nonetheless useful to highlight relevant insurance
problems. Suppose that twenty years ago, Company "A," a chemical
corporation, buried substantial amounts of contaminants on its
property, and that the following events ensued:
1. In Year One, A, while insured by Insurer X, ineffectively
disposed of certain toxic chemicals.
2. In Year Three, while A was insured by Insurer Y, the
chemicals continued to slowly leak and the contamination
progressively worsened.
3. In Year Five, while A was insured by Insurer Z, property
damage on the surrounding properties resulting from the toxic
chemicals became apparent.
The surrounding property owners sue A. All three insurance
companies deny coverage. Typically, Insurer X and Insurer Y would
argue for the court to adopt the manifestation theory of triggering
coverage, under which liability would attach to Insurer Z. Insurer Z,
however, would argue for the exposure trigger, under which liability
would attach to both Insurer X and Insurer Y. Finally, the insured
company A would argue for the continuous trigger theory, which
would warrant coverage by all three insurers and provide for the
largest recovery. The court is thus confronted with a clear dilemma
over how and to whom liability should attach. The court's decision
will hinge on which coverage trigger theory it chooses to apply. Under
this all too common scenario, coverage disputes have "erupted, fed by
the fires of the liability explosion" in the areas of toxic contamination
and asbestos. 1
45
It must be emphasized that, in claims against insurers in areas
such as asbestos and mold, "insurance coverage, if it exists, is created
144. Nicolas R. Andrea, Comment, Exposure, Manifestation of Loss, Injury-in-Fact,
Continuous Trigger: The Insurance Coverage Quagmire, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 813, 813-14 (1994).
Andrea provides cited examples to demonstrate the feasibility of his hypothetical situation,
which have been omitted here both for reasons of brevity and because the finer distinctions
between the competing insurance trigger theories are well established throughout. The following
example is drawn from this Comment.
145. John P. Arness & Randall D. Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property Damage" in
Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L. REV. 943, 943 (1986).
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and defined by the principles of contract rather than tort law."'146 This
principle will not have much relevance in claims brought directly by
homeowners against their insurers, because there will generally not
be any tort alleged. Many mold claims, however, involve third-party
disputes where a property owner brings a suit in tort against a builder
or other contractor alleging faulty construction or design that led to
the damage and the builder then seeks indemnification from the
insurer per the terms of their contact.
B. Coverage Trigger Disputes in Asbestos
Courts adjudicating asbestos claims generally apply one of the
theories discussed to determine when insurance coverage is triggered.
An early influential decision, AC&S, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., considered the application of three possible theories to a large-
scale asbestos lawsuit: exposure, manifestation, and pro-rata. 147 The
court found that the "exposure" theory generally requires any insurer
with a policy in effect at the time of a claimant's exposure to asbestos
products to defend and indemnify for any resulting judgment. 148 The
"manifestation" theory, on the other hand, obligates the insurer to
defend against only those claims which first manifested themselves
during its term of coverage. 149 Finally, the "pro-rata exposure" theory,
now known as the continuous trigger, views asbestos injuries as
occurring continuously from the first exposure until death. 150 Under
this theory, an insurer's obligations are prorated by the ratio of its
period of coverage to the total time of coverage.' 5' Each of the
competing rules considered in AC&S, along with the injury-in-fact
theory which the AC&S court did not discuss, has been considered and
applied on numerous occasions in the last few decades of toxic tort
litigation. 152
146. Id. at 948.
147. 544 F. Supp. 128, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The "pro-rata" theory has since been
incorporated into the continuous trigger theory, while the injury-in-fact theory was not yet




151. Id. at 129-30.
152. See infra Section IV.B.
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1. The Exposure Theory
In early asbestos litigation, most courts adopted some form of
the exposure theory when construing insurance contracts. 15 3 Courts
did so for various reasons. First, determining when an insured has
been exposed to an injury is simpler than is determining when an
injury "manifests." Perhaps the more compelling reason for adopting
the exposure theory in an asbestos case is that the exposure theory
seems most faithful to the insurance contract. 154 In Insurance Co. of
North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., the court first
concluded that the common construction of health insurance contracts
was most applicable to insurance claims arising out of asbestos
injuries. 15 5 Most health insurance policies do not cover a condition
until it is actually diagnosed. 156 Yet, courts usually find coverage for
health conditions caused before the insurance policy has been
purchased. 157 The court stated the proposition that the exposure
theory is most appropriate by saying as follows: "[I]t is the injury and
not its discovery that makes the manufacturer liable in the underlying
tort suit. As noted above, such underlying liability should also trigger
insurance coverage.' 58
The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all
continually favored the application of the exposure theory in asbestos
personal injury cases. 159 In its simplest terms, the exposure theory
states that the policy in force at the time the injured person or
property was exposed to the harm provides coverage. 60 The theory
was developed in reaction to personal injury cases involving asbestos,
primarily where the injury was said by medical experts to begin upon
initial inhalation of the asbestos fibers. 16' If the exposure was said to
continue throughout multiple policy periods, each policy in force could
be called upon to insure the loss.' 62 In rejecting any approach which
spans multiple policy periods, the exposure theory necessarily
presumes that the harm occurs simultaneously at the moment of
exposure to the hazardous substance.
153. AC&S, 544 F. Supp. at 130 n.1. But see Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 682 F.2d 12, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1982) (adopting the manifestation theory for the First Circuit).




158. Id. at 1220.
159. See LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.100.
160. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1217.
161. See, e.g., id. at 1217-23.
162. See LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04.
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2. The Manifestation Theory
Under the manifestation rule, a claim that is discoverable or
becomes apparent during a policy period will trigger that policy.
163
Because injury or damage can only be discovered once, only the
insurance policy in force at that time will provide coverage. In the
case of disease resulting from exposure to a substance such as
asbestos or toxic mold, the date of manifestation that triggers the
policy coverage is determined when the claimant has knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the disease, or when the disease is
diagnosed, whichever happens first. 164 In the context of a property
damage claim, the manifestation theory is often referred to as the
"first discovery" rule.165
The following example illustrates the application of the
manifestation theory to a personal injury claim resulting from
exposure to a toxic substance. 166 A person is exposed over time to a
toxic substance, which eventually results in a serious respiratory
illness. When initially exposed to the substance in his home, he is
unaware either that he has been exposed or that his health is
beginning to deteriorate. A few years later, after subsequent repeated
exposures to the toxic substance, he begins suffering health problems
over a period of several weeks, finally waking up one morning heaving
and coughing blood. The manifestation theory requires only the
current insurance policy in effect to respond. Different insurers or
different policies that were in place a few years earlier, when he was
first exposed to the toxic substance, would not be applicable.
The First Circuit took a minority position in applying the
manifestation theory to asbestos claims in the landmark case Eagle-
Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.167 In adopting
the exposure theory for asbestos claims, the Sixth Circuit reasoned
that "it is the injury and not its discovery" that should trigger the
underlying tort liability and subsequently insurance coverage. 168 In
contrast, the First Circuit rejected the exposure trigger in Eagle-
Picher because asbestosis is an injurious process beginning with the
163. See generally Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 613 F.
Supp. 1549, 1556 (D.N.J. 1985) (explaining the manifestation theory in its general context).
164. See, e.g., Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1216-17 (discussing the distinction
between the manifestation theory and various exposure theories).
165. See, e.g., U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1161-62
(W.D. Mich. 1988).
166. LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04. The hypothetical example is modeled on the example in
this insurance treatise but modified to more readily adapt to this Note.
167. 682 F.2d 12, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1982).
168. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1220.
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deposit of asbestos fibers in the lung and concluding with clinical
manifestation of the disease up to twenty years later.169 The medical
experts agreed that the underlying injuries do not occur
simultaneously with initial exposure and that the end result of
disabling disease or death is by no means inevitable even when the
asbestos fibers begin to scar the lungs. 170 Thus, the actual injury can
occur at any point along a vast continuum of up to twenty years, or the
exposure can produce no injurious effects whatsoever. It therefore
makes little sense to fix the point of injury at the time of exposure.
One reason that many courts have rejected the manifestation
trigger for asbestos cases is because "it ignores the fact that actual-
yet undiscovered-injury or damage may occur during earlier policy
periods for which those earlier policies should respond.' ' 1
Subsequently Eagle-Picher, as well as the other limited cases
involving a manifestation trigger for toxic tort claims, have been
narrowly construed revealing that the general approach has been
disfavored.
172
3. The Injury-in-Fact Theory
Under an injury-in-fact approach, the underlying insurance
policy is triggered when the damage or injury actually occurs,
regardless of the time of either exposure or discovery. 173 Like the
manifestation theory, only one policy will be triggered under this
approach.174 A criticism of this theory is that the determination of
which policy is triggered is often a difficult factual one to make-when
precisely the harm occurred must be documented by technical or
scientific evidence on a case by case basis.1 75 In the context of a
personal injury claim for toxic mold, the "date the injury occurred may
be different from when it was [first] diagnosable or discoverable."
'1 76
Proponents argue that this is the only trigger theory requiring an
actual showing of injury or disease within the disputed policy period,
169. Eagle-Picher Indus., 682 F.2d at 18.
170. Id.
171. Anthony Bartell & Patrick J. Perrone, Builders, Subcontractors and Architects: Finding
Insurance Coverage for Mold Litigation, 1-5 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MOLD 15 (May 2001).
172. See Fischer, supra note 23, at 645-46.
173. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 197 (W.D. Mo. 1986)
(adopting an injury-in-fact trigger applicable under Missouri law in a hazardous waste case).





and that it most closely tracks the plain meaning of the insurance
contracts. 177
The first use of the injury-in-fact trigger was, as two
commentators opined, a judicial attempt to establish consistency in
"the 'conceptual chaos' of the trigger of coverage controversy."'178 In a
suit against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, the Second Circuit
rejected both the manifestation and exposure theories. 179 In rejecting
the manifestation theory, the court noted that "[s]ome types of injury
to the body occur prior to the appearance of any symptoms; thus, the
manifestation of the injury may well occur after the injury itself."'180
Similarly, in rejecting the exposure theory, the court said, "[i]njury
cannot be read as the equivalent of exposure, because the policy
contemplates injury caused by exposure; since a cause normally
precedes its effect, it is plain that an injury could occur during the
policy period although the exposure that caused it preceded that
period."' 81
In general, the injury-in-fact trigger has been largely
overlooked in the realm of asbestos and other environmental or toxic
tort claims. The D.C. Circuit, however, applying New York law,
followed the Second Circuit and applied injury-in-fact to a case
involving an asbestos manufacturer. 8 2  In Abex Corporation v.
Maryland Casualty Company, the court examined a policy requiring
exposure that "results, during the policy period, in bodily injury" in
order for an insurer to be obligated to indemnify the insured. 8 3 The
court concluded that the unambiguous meaning of these words was
that "an injury-and not mere exposure-must result during the
policy period."'18 4 The court noted that the policies made an important
distinction and clearly distinguished exposure from injury, stating
that "[a]ny argument that mere exposure-without injury-triggers
liability is simply unsound linguistically."'1 5  Additionally, the
manifestation theory was rejected as inconsistent with the policy's
definition of "occurrence." The court summarized the seeming
inadequacies of the manifestation theory when compared to the new
177. See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760, 764-65 (2d Cir.
1984).
178. David J. Dykhouse & Joseph L. Falik, Trigger of Coverage: The Business Context, The
Plain Language, and American Home Products, 16 CONN. L. REV. 497, 512 (1984).
179. Am. Home Prods., 748 F.2d at 764.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Abex Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1986).





injury-in-fact doctrine: "Although the language of these policies
demands that the insured prove that an exposure caused an injury
during the policy period, it imposes no requirement that the injury be
discovered at that time.' 18 6
4. The Continuous Trigger Theory
Under the continuous trigger theory, all policies in effect (1) at
the time of initial exposure, (2) during any subsequent period of
continuing exposure, or (3) at the time of the physical manifestation of
the harm or damage would be forced to respond. 8 7 In a sense, the
continuous trigger combines the basic elements of all the other trigger
theories into one comprehensive rule. The continuous trigger theory
can be said to operate on the premise that indemnification and
liability extend to all insurers that are at risk from the earliest initial
exposure to the final manifestation of the loss or harm. 88 Obviously.
this theory is attractive to courts that support the doctrine of
construing insurance contracts to provide the insured with maximum
coverage. One federal court followed another leading asbestos case in
holding that "the policies were triggered if they were on the risk at
any time that the claimants suffered injury from asbestos through the
time of their death or the filing of their claim," concluding with the
resounding proclamation that "[t]his pragmatic approach is the
soundest 'theory' of all, and the one which this Court will follow."'18 9
In Keene Corp. v. Insurance Company of North America, the
continuous trigger theory was first espoused as a way of managing
ever-growing and ever-complex asbestos-related disease claims. 190 An
insulation manufacturer faced multiple lawsuits alleging that its
products gave the plaintiffs asbestosis and other diseases.' 9' Keene
was insured by at least five different insurers over separate periods
during the roughly twenty-five years during which it manufactured
products containing asbestos. 92  However, every one of Keene's
186. Id.
187. LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04.
188. Rebecca C. Earnest, Recent Development, Insurance Law and Asbestosis-When Is
Coverage of a Progressive Disease Triggered?, 58 WASH. L. REV. 63, 67 (1982).
189. Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Tex. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, W.R. Grace & Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1990).
190. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
191. Id. at 1038. Keene was ultimately a defendant in some capacity to over 6,000 lawsuits
as a result of its manufacturing operations from 1948-1972. Id.
192. Id. at 1038-39.
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insurers either completely or partially denied coverage for the
asbestos claims.1 93 Several of the insurers from earlier policy periods
urged the court to apply the manifestation theory, while Keene and a
separate insurer contended that the exposure trigger theory would be
proper, on the premise that exposure to asbestos constitutes the
covered injury. 194
The court ultimately rejected both arguments and adopted a
triple trigger theory, incorporating both the manifestation rule and
two varieties of the exposure theory. 195 This triple trigger theory has
since evolved into the formal continuous trigger theory. 196 The court
reasoned that the manifestation trigger should apply because it
comports with the reasonable expectations of the insured. The court
also reasoned that the exposure theory should apply because logic
dictates that the injurious process may be well under way, perhaps
during a different policy period, before the injury finally manifests
itself.197 The court also noted that such an inclusive trigger would go
the furthest toward maximizing coverage for the insured. 198 Finally,
the Keene court felt that its ruling would be equitable to the individual
insurers by not imposing costs on them beyond what they would
potentially pay under any single trigger theory. 199 Ultimately an
allocation of the loss would be made among the various carriers whose
policies were triggered. 200
While the continuous trigger theory has been criticized for
being too broad and unfair to insurers, it has gained a strong foothold
and enjoys relatively consistent application in asbestos claims.20 1
Some commentators have argued that it is also ideally suited for mold
claims because the nature of mold-related injury or damage is similar
193. Id. at 1039.
194. Id. at 1042-43.
195. Id. at 1044-47.
196. See, e.g., LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04[3].
197. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045-46.
198. Id. at 1041.
199. Id. at 1049-50.
200. Id. at 1049-50. However, the court did not make clear exactly how to apply this
equitable policy and ultimately spawned confusion and criticism from other courts trying to
apply the Keene trigger. See, e.g., Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 985-87 (N.J.
1985). There was also no effort made to determine whether allocating the loss would cause the
insurers to bear roughly the same exposure under the new continuous trigger as they would
under any other single trigger. One commentator has suggested that the court waffled by not
acknowledging its inapposite goals of maximum coverage and no increase in exposure to the
insurers. Fischer, supra note 23, at 650-51.
201. Andrea, supra note 142, at 846-49. But see, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759




to asbestos in that the injury or damage cannot be attributed
discretely to either the time of exposure or the time of
manifestation. 20 2 Further, "[r]equiring all policies [at] risk to respond
to mold claims spreads the occurrence ... and maximizes the
insurance coverage purchased by the policyholder."20 3
V. DISCUSSION
A. Mold: Is It Really the Next Asbestos?
Courts and commentators trying to establish guidelines for
resolving mold litigation should address the issue of whether it can
legitimately be called the next asbestos. 20 4 Insurers are claiming that
the comparison is appropriate and proffering that conclusion as the
justification for increasing premiums and withdrawing from certain
markets, leaving sizable segments of the population searching for new
coverage. 20 5  It appears that the plaintiffs' bar believes that the
comparison between mold and asbestos is appropriate as well, as
evidenced by the multitude of cases flooding courts across the
country.20 6 The labeling of toxic mold as the "next asbestos" affects
how both insurers and insureds pursue litigation while trying to
establish acceptable boundaries for themselves with respect to mold
liability. And, if both insurers and plaintiffs are reacting
disproportionately to the crisis, it becomes very difficult for any
meaningful solutions to be achieved without costly and lengthy
judicial involvement. A number of commentators addressing the issue
202. Bartell & Perrone, supra note 171; infra Part V.D.
203. Id. However, this benefit of the continuous trigger could also be its downfall if it leads
to drastically increased rates as insurers try to insulate themselves from ever-expansive judicial
rules seeking to place all the risk of the insurance contracts on insurers. See supra Part I.
204. It is beyond the scope of this Note to fully address the myriad of factors necessary to
determine whether the comparison between the infant toxic mold phenomenon and thirty years
of mammoth-scale asbestos litigation is appropriate. It is possible, however, to make some broad
observations and conclusions, primarily drawing on other commentators who have already
tackled this point. A cursory analysis of the "next asbestos" crown is necessary to the claims of
this Note because it proposes that courts need to abandon the prevailing methodology for
triggering insurance coverage in traditional toxic tort cases. This is easier to do if courts are
satisfied at the outset that toxic mold is an entirely different beast than asbestos. At the
present, the only thing certain is that mold has the potential to be the "next asbestos."
Regardless of whether toxic mold wreaks havoc or vanishes from the legal horizon in ten years,
this potential is sufficient to warrant both careful analysis of this Note and heightened scrutiny
of courts across the country in the near future.
205. See, e.g., Amon, supra note 10.
206. See, e.g., Reisinger, supra note 83.
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tend to group the toxic mold trends with asbestos, only briefly
mentioning other possibly more analogous claims.
20 7
There are obvious differences between asbestos and mold
litigation. Asbestos is a substance that was incorporated into a
number of manufactured construction products, while mold is a
naturally occurring phenomenon. 208 Plaintiffs who were harmed by
asbestos filed lawsuits against manufacturers who incorporated the
hazardous substance into products that ended up in homes or office
buildings.20 9  In mold cases, the toxic substance often appeared
without fault or involvement by any party other than nature. 210
Plaintiffs then seek reimbursement for mold damage from their
insurers. In this sense, it is difficult to call a mold case a "tort" at all
because there is no identifiable wrongdoer. 211 Rather, the claim is
more often a breach of contract or bad faith by an insurer, with mold
being only the underlying damage that precipitated an insurer's
tortious conduct.
21 2
On the other hand, there are branches of claims where the
toxic mold is alleged to directly spring from a tort such as faulty or
negligent design and construction of a building or home. 21 3  A
homeowner in this situation would sue the builder of her home
directly in tort. Or, a defendant insurer may sue the builder or other
entity it sees as ultimately responsible for the mold claim to which the
insurance company is forced to respond.21 4 Ultimately, particularly in
areas of toxic torts such as asbestos, "insurance coverage, if it exists, is
207. See, e.g., Harkins, supra note 69, at 1115.
208. Jarman-Felstiner, supra note 4, at 549-50.
209. Id. at 550.
210. See supra Part II.A.
211. Jarman-Felstiner, supra note 4, at 537-39.
212. See Maniloff, supra note 88, at 3-4.
213. See generally Mike Bischoff, Comment, Theories of Toxic Mold Liability Facing Arizona
Homebuilders, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 684-85 (2002). Bischoff theorizes that homebuilders,
engineers, subcontractors, architects, and others who may be responsible for constructing a home
will ultimately be the primary defendants in toxic mold litigation. In fact, Bischoff suggests the
cases when a homeowner directly sues her insurer regarding a toxic mold infestation will be the
exception rather than the norm. Id. While these assertions are highly debatable given the
current trends in mold litigation, they are also ultimately irrelevant to the conclusions of this
Note even if taken as true. Any type of builder or contractor sued for toxic mold will seek
coverage or indemnification from his insurer, and sue the insurer if (or, perhaps as the trends
indeed suggest, when) it denies coverage. Thus, an insurance company is still a defendant in the
case and trigger of coverage theories must still be considered. Also, builders will only be the
defendant in cases of new homes or buildings becoming infested with mold, which necessarily
leaves out the vast majority of potential mold claimants. Id. As new home warranties and
applicable statutes of limitations expire, the homeowners insurance necessarily becomes their
only source of recourse to mold damage.
214. Id.
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created and defined by the principles of contract rather than tort
law."215 So, it is perhaps irrelevant to categorize toxic mold claims as
any tort at all. All of the asbestos cases referenced thus far, however,
also only questioned whether insurance coverage existed for the
underlying damage or disease, not whether there was an actionable
claim or liability for a specific tort.
In this light, it seems reasonable for courts to refer to asbestos
cases involving insurance disputes as a guide to toxic mold claims
involving insurance disputes. Both injuries result from exposure to a
harmful substance in a home or building, and the injuries usually do
not manifest immediately. In the case of mold, the period from
exposure to manifestation will generally be a great deal shorter than
asbestos, and this should undoubtedly play a role when courts are
tailoring asbestos law to fit mold law. 216
The answer to the question "is mold the next asbestos?" will
shape the reaction of both insurers and injured plaintiffs. 217 This
requires a consideration not of the legal issues differentiating the two
types of claims, but rather the factual ones. One commentator has
advanced five basic and compelling reasons why "the stars are not
aligned for mold to warrant such an ambitious label" as the next
asbestos. 21
8
First, there will simply never be enough claims to replicate the
"asbestos business model," in which a single defendant often faced
thousands of lawsuits for the same action. To avoid suffocation from
the sheer volume of lawsuits, the interested parties often entered into
global settlements. 219 This situation simply will not be replicated with
mold claims.220 Each occurrence of toxic mold will be an isolated
215. See Arness & Eliason, supra note 145, at 948.
216. See Jackson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 835 P.2d 786, 788-89 (Nev. 1992); Nelson,
supra note 45.
217. Or, from a more cryptic and cynical view, the critical question is whether "plaintiffs'
attorneys have sunk to a new level in taking advantage of the mold scare." See Reisinger, supra
note 83, at 52. There can be no question that mold is creating a feeding frenzy right now among
plaintiffs' attorneys precisely because it has the potential to be the next asbestos. One
commentator has opined that there will be much less of an insurance "pot" to cover mold claims,
and "while certainly not preventing mold litigation-will surely make the litigation less
attractive for a plaintiffs attorney deciding how best to use the finite number of hours in his or
her work day." Randy J. Maniloff, Mold: 5 Reasons Why It Is Not the 'Next Asbestos,' 2-6
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MOLD 35 (May 2002).
218. Maniloff, supra note 88, at 25.
219. Id. at 25-26. Courts were often very interested, if not insistent upon, these mass
settlements. Id.
220. This is not to say that individual insurers will not each face thousands of toxic mold
claims. However, each claim will be independent and fact specific. Thus, parties will not join
together in potential class action suits. But, it is impossible to predict the outcome of such
massive litigation, and it is entirely possible that the sheer number of individual mold claimants
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event. There will be no opportunity for the use of form pleadings and
mass settlements.2
21
Second, most mold claims are for property damage and are filed
directly against the insurer. 222 The trend indicates that the majority
of claims have no connection to liability at all, but rather are simply
individual homeowners' insurance claims. 223 There have been less
than twenty cases thus far where mold claims against contractors or
building owners have resulted in settlements or awards of $1 million
or more. 2
24
Third, the insurance industry is reacting much more quickly to
mold claims than it reacted to asbestos claims by altering policies to
specifically limit or exclude mold.225 While the loss of insurance
coverage for mold claims obviously does not bar lawsuits against the
parties potentially responsible for the growth of toxic mold in the first
place, "the likely reality is that without insurance dollars to pay any
settlement or judgment, the plaintiffs bar's motivation to bring the
case (and especially on a contingent fee) will be lost."226
Fourth, mold likely will have a much shorter trigger period
than asbestos. 227  Even if there is pressure against insurance
companies to completely eliminate mold coverage, the nature of mold
simply makes it unlikely that potential plaintiffs will be able to sue to
enforce multiple insurance policies stretching back for decades as
happened in the asbestos arena. 228 The evidence to date indicates that
mold does not have any latent symptoms like asbestos; in fact,
symptoms connected to toxic mold often disappear if the injured party
is removed from contact with the mold.
229
Finally, the insurance industry simply cannot afford another
asbestos. 230 From 2001 to 2002, the insurance industry as a whole had
will exceed cumulative asbestos claimants. For example, the Texas Department of Insurance
estimated that over 44,000 claims (not lawsuits) were filed in that state alone during 2000-01, an
increase of well over 500 percent from the previous year. See Tex. Coalition for Affordable Ins.
Solutions, Mold Facts, http://www.tcais.org/insurance/mold-facts.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
221. Maniloff, supra note 88, at 26. But insurance companies could in fact adopt some type
of "form" settlement to dispose of large numbers of mold claims creating a backlog in their claims
departments. But it is highly unlikely that insurers will do this in the context of settling actual
lawsuits.
222. Id. at 27.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 28-29.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 29-30.
228. Id.
229. See Jarman-Felstiner, supra note 4, at 547.
230. See Maniloff, supra note 88, at 30-31.
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its first ever net loss for a full year, losing a combined $7.9 billion after
taxes.2 31 This loss has been blamed on numerous factors, including
September 11 payouts, aggressive competition throughout the 1990s,
and the sharp decline in investment values as a result of stock market
losses.232  The bottom line is that insurers are taking the
unprecedented action of pulling out of markets rather than risk
another realm of litigation akin to asbestos, thus assuring that mold
will not in fact replicate asbestos.
While mold will not likely rival asbestos litigation in terms of
sheer volume and economic damage, it still could be the next major
litigation crisis facing courts nationwide. Courts should only look to
asbestos litigation as a model to the extent that they seek to avoid the
negative results of the past thirty years including the enormous
litigation costs and inefficient use of scarce judicial resources.
B. What Trigger Is Appropriate to Act as a "Judicial Gatekeeper"?
Trigger theories act as gatekeepers by determining which
insurance policies have to respond to given claims. 233 Thus, at the
very outset of litigation, courts have the power to dismiss claims
against insurers that do not fit within the particular court's trigger of
coverage theory. These rules can have a strong influence on the
eventual direction of mold claims by keeping possibly frivolous claims
against multiple insurers out of courts in the first place. This issue is
so important in the new area of toxic mold litigation because insurers
are simply excluding coverage for mold or pulling out of markets
rather than facing an uncertain future in which they may or may not
have to respond to an endless stream of past, present, and future
claims for toxic mold. It has been well established that vastly
different results arise from the exact same claims brought in
jurisdictions that apply different coverage trigger theories.
234
When trigger theories vary from state to state and are not even
applied uniformly within jurisdictions, insurers are unable to gauge
their potential future obligations, which is the essence of what pricing
insurance requires. One of the reasons that asbestos litigation has
been so costly is that application of exposure theories led to multiple
231. In Texas alone, ground zero for toxic mold claims, the insurance industry has
collectively suffered $3 billion in underwriting losses since 1998. See Tex. Coalition for
Affordable Ins. Solutions, supra note 220.
232. Id.
233. See discussion supra Part W.A.
234. See supra Part IV.B.
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insurers who issued policies years or even decades apart were being
forced to respond to the same claim.235 On the other hand, the
manifestation rule provides that since the injury or damage can only
be discovered once, only the policy in force when the harm is first
discovered or "manifests" will cover the loss. 236 In the context of
personal injury, the injury may manifest either when the symptoms of
the disease or injury first appear, or at the time when the injury or
disease is first capable of diagnosis. 237 Similarly, in property damage
claims, manifestation occurs when the damage is first discovered or,
through reasonable care, should have been discovered. 238 If exposure
theories are applied consistently in mold cases, insurers may have
some predictability but will likely go bankrupt. For the two year
period between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2001, Texas
insurers incurred total costs of over $1 billion dollars in mold
claims.239 Those losses represent only the relative infancy of toxic
mold litigation. It was enough to cause the nation's largest home
insurer to cancel an unimaginable 700,000 policies. 240 While still
nowhere near the economic costs incurred through asbestos litigation,
both sides will clearly lose if this trend continues.
C. The Manifestation Theory Is the Best Fit for Toxic Mold
This Note proposes that a shift by courts to strict application of
the manifestation trigger theory in toxic mold cases will help to stave
off an economic disaster for both insurance companies and the public
at large, while also providing the most equitable results for both
parties. Application of this single trigger theory will provide much
needed certainty in the mold arena and will allow all parties
potentially coming into contact with mold to adequately quantify the
economic risks involved.
235. See generally Jackson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 835 P.2d 786, 788 (Nev. 1992)
(explaining that where the different insurers from the periods ranging from when the damage
first occurred to when it is first discovered all have to respond, there will be much greater costs
involved).
236. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.
1982); Jackson, 835 P.2d at 788; LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04.
237. E.g., Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 24-25 (stating that the illness must be "reasonably
capable of diagnosis").
238. E.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986).
239. Tex. Dep't of Ins., Mold Data-All Claims, (June 14, 2002), http://www.tdi.state.tx.us
/commishlnews/molddata2.html.
240. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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The California Supreme Court held in Prudential-LMI
Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court that shifting to a
manifestation trigger promotes sounder public policy than previous
rules, because "[t]he manifestation rule.., promotes certainty in the
insurance industry and allows insurers to gauge premiums with
greater accuracy. ' 241 This should reduce costs for consumers because
insurers can set aside proper reserve funds for well defined coverage
and avoid increasing those reserves to cover potential financial losses
caused by uncertainty in the definition of covered claims.242 The
Prudential-LMI court also addressed the issue of fairness to the
consumers, arguing that under the manifestation rule "the reasonable
expectations of insureds are met because they look to their present
carrier for coverage. 243 At the same time, the underwriting practices
of the insurer are predictable because the insurer is not liable for a
loss once a contract ends, unless the manifestation of loss occurred
during its contract term.244
Proponents of manifestation triggers generally advance two
broad policy arguments, similar to those of the California court, in
support of the test. First, actual injuries or damages only occur when
they become apparent, and insurers cannot be expected to provide
coverage for preexisting injuries, of which neither the insurer nor the
insured had knowledge when the policy was effective. 245  More
importantly, the test provides for certainty, allowing insurers to better
gauge potential liabilities and thus respond better to all insurance
consumers.246
Critics contend that manifestation rules effectively collapse
occurrence insurance into claims-made coverage and allow insurers to
exit markets and leave policy holders exposed. 247 Another criticism of
a pure manifestation rule is that it fails to provide maximum coverage
for the insured.248
The first concern raised about the manifestation rule is more
compelling, yet ultimately is not sufficient to justify adhering to the
241. 798 P.2d 1230, 1246-47 (Cal. 1990) (remanded on other factual grounds).
242. Id. (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281-82 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988)).
243. Id. at 1247.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1550-51 (C.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that in property damage cases, injury occurred when the claimant realized actual
economic loss), affld, 41 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1994).
246. See, e.g., Chemstar, 41 F.3d at 434-35.
247. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 485 (E.D. Mich. 1989)




rule. "In most cases... the manifestation rule would reduce coverage:
insurers would refuse to write new insurance for the insured when it
became apparent that the period of manifestations, and hence a flood
of claims, was approaching. '249 Another court explained the criticism
by saying "[u]nder the manifestation theory, coverage can become
illusory when the manufacturer of a product is faced with an
increasing rate of injured persons. At a certain point, the
manufacturer will be unable to secure any insurance coverage. Thus,
when some of the injured persons manifest their injury, there will be
no insurance."250
In the case of mold, this argument suggests that as the number
of mold claims begins to increase precipitously, insurers would simply
stop issuing policies and exit the market to protect themselves.
Indeed, insurers are doing just that in Texas to avoid a spate of costly
toxic mold litigation, but it has little to do with the particular trigger
of coverage rule employed by Texas courts. 251  Texas does not
subscribe to the manifestation rule in the case of personal injuries
resulting from progressive diseases such as asbestosis and (thus far)
toxic mold ailments.252 In cases of personal injury due to asbestos-
related disease, Texas adheres to the exposure theory.253 Thus it is
arguable that insurers might try to pull out of markets to avoid a
massive spate of claims regardless of which trigger theory is
employed, and it makes no sense to confine this criticism to the
manifestation rule. This criticism of the manifestation rule also
concludes that any rule which exposes policy holders is inherently
unfavorable; thus it implies that only a rule which disfavors and
exposes insurers to risk is preferable.
Texas does apply the manifestation theory to pure property
damage cases involving asbestos or like substances. 254  This
application is in line with emerging trends in numerous jurisdictions
to adopt the manifestation trigger in pure property damage cases.
California courts, for example, have increasingly been applying
manifestation triggers in a wider variety of cases, including third-
party damage cases and progressive damage cases.255
249. Id. at 485.
250. Hancock Labs., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1985).
251. See supra Part III.B.
252. See Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Azrock Indus., Inc., 211 F.3d 239, 247, 250-52 (5th Cir. 2000)
(determining under the Erie doctrine which trigger theory applies under Texas law in asbestos
cases).
253. Id. at 250-51.
254. Id. at 247-48.
255. See County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Harbor Ins. Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 93-95 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993); Whittaker Corp. v. Allianz Underwriters, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659 (1992).
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Insurers should have the right to choose to exit the market
after such a monstrous financial hit from insurance claims. Giving
insurers this option is different than allowing insurers to ""refuse to
write new insurance for the insured when it became apparent that the
period of manifestations, and hence a flood of claims, was
approaching."256  "Manifestation" only occurs when the property
damage is discovered or in the reasonable exercise of care should have
been discovered. Under the manifestation trigger, therefore, it is
technically impossible for insurers to foresee a period of damages or
injury yet to appear.
257
In a personal injury context, both a disease such as asbestosis
and the effects of mold manifest either when discovered or when it
becomes "reasonably capable of medical diagnosis." 258 Insurers cannot
predict when a multitude of covered occurrences are about to
manifest. Logic dictates that if insurers could anticipate a
manifestation, then the damage or injury should be considered to have
already manifested and the policy must respond. Insurers cannot
thus avoid their contractual obligations and duties to provide coverage
or indemnification during the policy period in question.
Even if this criticism of the manifestation theory is valid, there
seems to be no favorable alternative. An insurer should not be forced
to continue renewing unprofitable policies. If a thousand lawsuits
have been filed against an asbestos manufacturer in each of the
preceding two years, it would be absurd to demand that the
manufacturer's insurer continue to insure the manufacturer.
Similarly, suppose an insurer provides homeowners insurance to five
homes out of twenty on a given block, and in the past year ten homes
on the block, but none covered by the insurer, have filed mold claims
that cost other insurers $30,000 each to resolve. When it comes time
to renew each of the policies, the company yet to have any mold claims
is nonetheless going to drastically increase the rates or cancel the
policies. The company should not be forced to renew all the policies
for substantially the same price; that would be inherently unfair or
unjust given the almost certain likelihood that at least half of the
homes will suffer $30,000 in toxic mold damage in the coming year.259
256. Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 485 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
257. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986).
258. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 25 (lst Cir. 1982).
259. If state insurance regulations cap homeowners' premiums at an unfavorable rate to
insurers, the insurers may thus choose to exit the market because of an inability to raise
premiums. In that situation, insurers would choose to leave a given market only after
considering the cost of losing all of the business in the state; state insurance boards would not
permit insurance companies to exit only selective portions of the market. See supra Part III.B.
Regardless, the preceding examples are solely intended to serve as counterarguments to
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Insurance is not meant to function in such a constrained
manner. Insurance essentially shifts risk for a cost. Insurers use
statistical models to determine what the cost of a particular risk
should be. If person X is a seventy-year-old lifelong smoker, no
reasonable person disputes the notion that her health insurance
should cost substantially more than a healthy twenty-year-old. The
seventy-year-old may not even be able to obtain insurance. It is
unreasonable to require that a private insurer provide what is deemed
reasonably affordable coverage at a debilitating cost to the
company. 260 Yet criticisms of the manifestation theory, as thus far
applied to other toxic torts, would result in just such perverted
outcome.
Even where a strict manifestation rule is used in the context of
toxic mold claims, there is still flexibility to allow courts to technically
adhere to it while avoiding what may be perceived as inequitable
results to injured plaintiffs, as a recent decision by a federal judge in
Texas illustrates. In Lewis v. State Farm Lloyds, the homeowner
discovered black mold covering portions of the interior walls, just
three days after closing on the home and activating her homeowners
policy. 261 The insurer hired an engineering firm to investigate the
mold growth. 262 The company concluded that prior to the purchase of
the home, a toilet leak had caused extensive water damage that
caused the mold accumulation. 263 The insurer denied the claim on the
ground that the mold damage occurred prior to the effective date of
the policy.264  Both parties agreed that the mold damage was
preexisting, but they disagreed over whether the damage was
identifiable before the sale. This disagreement is relevant because
manifestation occurs when the damage is first discovered or using
reasonable care should have been discovered. 265 The court refused,
criticisms of the manifestation trigger of coverage theory as applied by courts. They are not
intended to implicate state regulation and other outside forces influencing the insurance market.
260. These examples are applicable to private insurers who are presumably active in the
insurance marketplace to do what all companies do: earn a profit on the product or service they
provide. They are not meant to make any judgment on the appropriateness or necessity of
publicly funded insurance programs for either homeowners or seventy-year-old lifelong smokers.
261. Lewis v. State Farm Lloyds, No. G-02-246 (S.D. Tex. July 12, 2002) (order denying




265. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986). This
scenario also raises another relevant issue to cases involving homeowners: looking for mold as
part of the standard home inspection at the time of sale. Inspectors use a device that detects
moisture at certain levels in the walls of a home. Interview with E. Vanessa Edwards, Realtor,
Coldwell Banker Barnes, in Franklin, Tenn. (Jan. 31, 2002). This has become standard practice
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however, to make a determination of when the damage first
manifested or should have been reasonably discovered, instead
applying the following reasoning:266
The Court does not need to decide when the pre-existing mold damage occurred,
however, because new mold damage, arguably at least, occurred after the Policy went
into effect. Although Plaintiff bought her home after the mold growth began, the mold
undoubtedly continued to grow and cause increasing alleged toxicity within the home on
a daily basis. Mold is not a static condition ... at least some portion of the offensive
mold grew and caused damage that initially became "capable of being perceived,
recognized and understood" during the policy period.
2 6 7
The criticism that the manifestation rule will cause insurers to
flee markets seems flimsy at best. The other broad criticism of the
manifestation rule, that it fails to provide maximum coverage for the
insured, has even less logical support. While some may consider this
to be a sound and socially desirable goal, it does not comport with
well-settled legal theory. In adopting a continuous trigger rule for
asbestos cases, the Keene court discussed at length the manifestation
theory and other rules that fail "to give effect to the policies' dominant
purpose of indemnity. ' 268 The court then noted that its analysis of any
policy must proceed aided "by the well-accepted rule that ambiguity in
an insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured."269
While courts should construe ambiguities in favor of the insured, they
should not construe insurance contracts to provide for coverage that
does not exist. Thus if a policy covers damage due to "fungus," but is
silent regarding "mold," a court could reasonably construe the
ambiguity in favor of the insured and find that mold is covered.
Whether or not a manifestation trigger applies as opposed to exposure
or injury-in-fact will not change this analysis in the slightest. 270
Rather, the trigger will determine whether there was even an
in a number of mold-prone states, including Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas. Id. While this
practice in theory could identify preexisting mold, in reality it is little more than a tool to absolve
the home inspector of liability. Id. Toxic mold requires so little moisture to develop that is very
close to impossible to detect in small pockets. See supra Part II.A. Although the technology to
detect mold could greatly improve in the futire, at present it is simply not possible to fix a point
in time as certified "mold-free."
266. Lewis, No. G-02-246 (order denying motion for summary judgment).
267. Id.
268. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041-42 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
269. Id. at 1041.
270. Indeed, an important distinction to highlight is that insurance triggers are judicial
rules, while any "ambiguities" in an insurance policy are necessarily imperfections in the
contract itself. Thus, ambiguities in the actual contract should presumably be construed in favor
of the weaker bargaining party, which is obviously the policy holder. But as previously noted,
even if an insurance contract included specific reference to an intended coverage trigger, courts
would not likely give effect to such a clause because it would be infringing upon the judicial
policy of a given jurisdiction. See supra Part IV.A.
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insurance policy in force at the time of the occurrence. A policy that
promotes application of any rule that finds insurance coverage, just to
promote maximum coverage for plaintiffs, is absurd.
Again, applying the manifestation rule does not have to entail
abandoning insurance coverage for mold damage altogether. Rather,
the central concern of the judicial system should be to provide
certainty for all parties in hopes of reducing already large transaction
costs. There was a time when the presence of asbestos, lead-paint, or
high levels of radon in a structure posed such uncertain risks that
property transactions simply could not be completed forcing many
sectors of both society and the economy to suffer.271 Today, however,
all parties, from lenders to insurers to building occupants, are able to
effectively quantify the risks and costs associated with those
materials. As a result, these potential toxins have become just
another issue to address in the relevant negotiations, albeit an issue
that does and should call for concern. 27
2
It is certainly significant that at such an early point in the
development of toxic mold litigation, several federal courts have
shown a willingness to apply manifestation rules, even though they
were routinely cast aside in asbestos cases.273 Although most of the
plaintiffs' insurance claims were defeated in New Orleans Assets after
the court applied the manifestation rule, the claimants were still able
to recover appropriate damages directly from the building architects
and other defendants linked to the actual causation of the toxic mold
occurrences. 274 Similarly, in the Centex-Rooney case, Martin County
ultimately recovered a judgment of more than $14 million in mold
damages, interest, and attorney fees against the builder, several
subcontractors, and their insurers. 275 In both of these landmark cases,
the plaintiffs were able to recoup their losses despite their own
insurance carriers not being held liable. 276  Although the
manifestation rule may ultimately limit claims against insurers, it
will not prevent injured plaintiffs from recovering appropriate
damages in mold cases. To complete this analysis, it is necessary to
discuss not only why the manifestation rule will best guide courts in
resolving toxic mold claims, but why the other available trigger
theories specifically will not.
271. See Wright & Irby, supra note 13, at 307.
272. Id.
273. See supra Part III.B.
274. Louisiana Federal Judge Lets Subrogation Claims Stand in Mold Contamination Case,
3-2 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MOLD 9 (Feb. 2003); see supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
275. Centex-Rooney Constr. Co. v. Martin County, 706 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
276. See infra notes 274-275.
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D. Why the Other Theories Must Wash Out in Mold Cases
1. The Exposure Theory
The exposure theory developed in reaction to personal injury
claims involving asbestos, most notably where medical experts said
the injury began upon initial inhalation of the asbestos fibers. 277 One
reason for this is that determining when there is exposure is simply
easier than determining when an injury "manifests." The exposure
theory necessarily presumes that the harm occurs at the moment of
initial exposure to the hazardous substance. Identifying the time of
initial exposure has proven difficult with a notoriously toxic substance
such as asbestos.278 This theory has very little room for application in
toxic mold claims, where there is a general dearth of scientific and
medical data.279
Exposure to asbestos usually occurs over a period of time in
either one's home or place of employment. Regardless of the scenario,
it should be possible to fix the rough time period of the initial
exposure, either by determining the first date of employment in the
contaminated environment or the first date of residence in the
contaminated home. The date of initial exposure cannot similarly be
fixed in a toxic mold case because the date when mold first began to
grow generally cannot be fixed. Certainly one can attempt to date the
moisture source which likely produced the mold, as in the case of a
flooded basement or burst water pipe, but even then it is not possible
to determine when the mold actually first appeared. The closest one
might reasonably hope to determine is the date when, in the
reasonable exercise of care, the mold should have been discovered. 280
Asbestos and other man-made toxic substances are tangible in
nature. Whether they were put in walls or buried underground, it is
possible to document the precise point in time when they were put
there or when the party in question first came into contact with them.
Conversely, mold is naturally occurring and it is virtually impossible
to pinpoint the precise point in time when it first appeared in a wall or
underground. Thus the quandary arises: how can courts determine
277. See supra Part IV.B.1.
278. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting
medical evidence which indicates that inhalation of asbestos fibers and even subsequent
deleterious effects does not in all cases culminate in disabling disease or death).
279. See supra Part II.
280. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986).
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whether or not a given insurance policy applies by using a rule which
requires them to apply those policies that were in effect when the
injured party was exposed to the toxic mold, when it is impossible to
determine when the toxic mold even came into existence?
2. The Injury-in-Fact Theory
The injury-in-fact theory should not be applied in toxic mold
cases because it is simply too burdensome of an analysis to undertake
in large numbers of cases. On its face, a rule that only triggers the
underlying policy at the time the actual injury or damage occurs
regardless of when either exposure or discovery occurred seems like
sound policy.28' The determination of when precisely the injury
occurred, however, is usually a very difficult factual determination.
28 2
Pinpointing the time of injury must be documented by technical or
scientific evidence on a case-by-case-basis. 28 3 The date of injury in a
toxic mold claim is likely different than the dates when the victim was
exposed to the mold and when the problem was first discoverable or
diagnosable, and this fact can only further confuse the matter. Much
like trying to pinpoint the time of exposure, fixing the date of actual
injury or damage in a toxic mold case is too subjective. Although the
health effects of toxic mold are not as well established as asbestosis, it
is certain that they do not occur instantaneously but rather develop
over time.28 4 The most a court can hope to determine in this context is
when the injury from toxic mold exposure was first discovered or first
manifested.
The injury-in-fact trigger was developed as a judicial attempt
to establish consistency in the chaos of the trigger of coverage
controversy. 28 5 In fact, it is much more difficult to establish the
quantum of injury necessary to trigger coverage than it is to establish
manifestation or even exposure. 28 6 Courts applying this trigger have
to establish some guidelines at the outset as to what constitutes an
"injury."28 7 Not only may the medical fact of injury be debated, but the
281. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 197 (W.D. Mo. 1986)
(adopting an injury-in-fact trigger applicable under Missouri law in a hazardous waste case).
282. See LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04.
283. Id.
284. See supra Part II.B.
285. Dykhouse & Falik, supra note 178, at 512.




injury-in-fact inquiry is necessarily distinct from whether a causal
relationship exists between the mold exposure and the injury.288 It is
telling that this trigger has largely been ignored in most toxic tort and
environmental cases.
3. The Continuous Trigger Theory
The continuous trigger should be discarded by courts in toxic
mold cases for two reasons. First, it is not possible to fix the exact time
of the initial exposure to the toxic mold, which is a necessary
component of this trigger. Second, the inequitable results to insurers
resulting from this rule have fueled unchecked asbestos litigation and
its ensuing economic havoc. Under the continuous trigger theory, all
policies in effect at (1) the time of initial exposure, (2) during any
subsequent period of continuing exposure, and (3) the time of the
physical manifestation of the harm or damage would be forced to
respond.28 9 This Note has already proposed that the first element, the
time of initial exposure, cannot in fact be fixed in toxic mold cases. 290
If that time cannot be fixed, it can also be argued that the second
element cannot be firmly established either, because if there is no
concrete "initial" period, there can be no identifiable "subsequent"
period. The only necessary element of a continuous trigger that can be
firmly established is the time of physical manifestation of the harm or
damage.
In addition, the proponents of the continuous trigger who claim
that it is the most equitable to plaintiffs are the ones who would bring
toxic mold the closest to becoming the next asbestos. 291 It is precisely
the fact that insurance policies spanning decades were all forced to
respond to a single exposure that has made asbestos claims such a
boon to plaintiffs' attorneys. The potential "pot" available from the
aggregate of ten or twenty years of insurance policy limits is
staggering. This is not to say that all, or even the majority, of
asbestos claims and developing toxic mold claims are frivolous or
brought under questionable motives. Nonetheless, the potential for
huge awards almost certainly produces needless litigation that
overwhelms the limited resources of the nation's judicial systems.
Furthermore, toxic mold simply has not been shown to be anywhere
288. Id. at 642-43.
289. See LATHROP, supra note 19, § 6.04.
290. See supra Part V.D.1.
291. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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near as harmful as asbestos, which certainly eliminates most of the
underlying policy concerns that fueled the development of the
continuous trigger in the asbestos context.292 Until there is more data
on the real damage caused by toxic mold, there is no justification for
imposing on insurers the harsh outcomes of the continuous trigger
theory.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is too early to gauge with certainty the scope and scale
of toxic mold litigation, there can be little doubt that large numbers of
claims and lawsuits will continue to be filed and large damage awards
rendered. There is a major insurance crisis looming for both the
average homeowner and commercial conglomerates in mold-prone
states, as Texas demonstrates. While it cannot yet be said whether
mold will live up to its billing as the next asbestos, it should not even
come close. 293 But, litigation trends are not always measured in
particularly rational terms. Public perception of the toxic mold
phenomenon is going to shape the vigor with which it is pursued as a
cause of action; courts must not let the public mood dictate initial
policy decisions that will shape the future of this developing arena.
Trigger theories act as judicial gatekeepers, and the explosion
of toxic mold claims cries out for such gate keeping. 294 These rules,
identifying which insurance policies may have to respond to particular
claims, have a strong influence on the progress and resolution of the
litigation of those claims. 295 This has been particularly relevant in
mass tort cases where the courts actively promote settlement instead
of further litigation, and finding some insurance coverage for the claim
becomes the "judicial carrot" to further the policy of insurers bearing
the burdens of settlement. 296 Courts must be careful, however, to
balance the legitimate interests of insurers. Uniformly applying the
manifestation trigger theory will ultimately provide both a check on
uncontrolled mold litigation as well as an equitable balance between
injured plaintiffs and their insurance carriers. By accomplishing
these goals, courts can ensure that they do not divert too many of their
scarce judicial resources into adjudicating untold thousands of mold
292. See supra Section IV.B.4.
293. See supra Section V.A.
294. See Fischer, supra note 23, at 631-32.
295. Id. at 632.
296. See supra Part W.A.
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claims, but instead focus their efforts on more pressing legal and
societal concerns.
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